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Balkan or Border Warfare? Glimpses from the Early Modern Period
“‘Balkan’ had become shorthand for a geographic area but 
also for a state of mind.”
Margaret MacMillan, Peacemakers (London 2001), 121
Abstract: At the beginning of the early modern period, the concept of Europe did not yet ex-
ist. Religion, not politics or geography, was the defining criterion. It was Christendom that 
people referred to – not Europe – when they wanted to introduce the concept of burden-
sharing. In military terms, differences between Oriental and Occidental empires were less 
obvious; if anything, the Ottomans seemed to have a head-start in terms of centralization 
and professionalism. It was not the impact of Ottoman rule as such that created the con-
ditions for “Balkan warfare”. It was the unsettled character of the borders between “East” 
and “West” that gave rise to a form of low-intensity conflict that might be said to provide a 
foretaste of what came to be known as Balkan warfare.
Keywords: Balkan warfare, Early Modern period, Ottomans, Habsburgs, Venice
Regular vs. irregular warfare
There is probably no hard and fast definition for what is often referred to as Balkan warfare, except a geographical one. If there is a popular image as-
sociated with that term, it is probably one not far from the anecdote recounted 
by Elizabeth Roberts in her history of Montenegro about the tribesman who of-
fered to cut off his wounded (Russian) comrade’s head so that the Turks would 
not get it; and the postscript by a civilized Montenegrin teacher a few genera-
tions later, who pleaded with visitors to appreciate the improvement that his 
countrymen were no longer cutting off prisoners’ heads but only noses.1 
Put in structural terms, the salient features of “Balkan warfare” can prob-
ably be summed up as a preponderance of “irregular” troops and warfare, ac-
companied by a measure of brutality allegedly lacking in the more civilized or 
more central parts of Europe. In many ways this image of Balkan warfare is a 
* lothar.hoebelt@univie.ac.at
1 Elizabeth Roberts, Realm of the Black Mountain (London 2007), 172, 292.
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product of the late nineteenth century when European warfare appeared to have 
been domesticated to brief, sharp, tournament-like engagements fought in an 
allegedly gentlemanly manner, like “duels among friends”.2 We should not forget, 
however, that during the same period the Southern – rather than the Eastern3 – 
part of Europe was ravaged by insurrections and “counter-insurgency”, liberally 
sprinkled with massacres, from the original “guerrillas” of Napoleonic Spain4 and 
the Carlist Wars to the “brigantaggio” of the Italian “mezzogiorno” in the early 
1860’s.5 The “Bulgarian horrors” of the late 1870’s that played such a prominent 
part in the lore of British election campaigns fit into that pattern rather easily.6 
After the Congress of Berlin in 1878, multi-ethnic Macedonia7 continued to be 
racked by incursions of komitadji bands. Karl May, the popular German fiction 
writer, immortalized that image when he sent his first person hero Kara Ben 
Nemsi from the “Hollows of the Balkans” into the “Land of the Skipetars”.
That sort of nineteenth-century exceptionalism of course begs the ques-
tion whether “Balkan warfare” in the early modern period was actually all that 
2 Egon Caesar Conte Corti, Kaiser Franz Joseph I., vol. 2 (Graz 1952), 376 (Wrangel to 
Hess).
3 The Polish rising of 1830, at least, was conducted in a far more conventional style; whereas 
the one of 1863 was characterized as “one of the world’s earliest examples of urban guerrilla 
warfare” by Norman Davies, God’s Playground: A History of Poland, vol. 2 (Oxford 1981, 353). 
Jozef Pilsudski, Erinnerungen und Dokumente, vol. 3 (Essen 1936), 143, 159 – who tried to 
defend its legacy politically and morally, while criticizing its military activities – once charac-
terized the 1863 rising as an “armed demonstration”, fuelled by the illusionary hope to trigger 
either an all-Russian revolution or an intervention by the Western Powers. Interestingly, for 
a Pole, Pilsudski felt he had to defend Russian terror against the civilian population as an 
appropriate activity that everybody who wanted to throttle a revolution – “be he Russian or 
English” – would always use (ibid. 144). 
4 Charles Esdaile, Fighting Napoleon: guerrillas, bandits, and adventurers in Spain, 1808–1814 
(New Haven 2004).
5 Giordano Bruno Guerri, Il sangue del Sud. Antistoria del Risorgimento e del Brigantaggio 
(Milan 2010).
6 Richard Shannon, Gladstone. Heroic Minister 1865–1898 (London 1999), 175, points out 
that initially Gladstone himself was quite surprised at the impact of the Balkan atrocities on 
British public opinion: “I have been astonished at its [the Bulgarian agitation’s] commence-
ment and progress.” Hence “his lateness in perceiving it and tardiness in jumping on to it”. A. 
N. Wilson, The Victorians (London 2002), 404, notes that Gladstone’s “campaign-manager, 
Lord Rosebery, had attended Democratic rallies in the United States and modelled the meet-
ings partly on American political conventions.” German novelist Dieter Schwanitz, Der Cam-
pus (Frankfurt/M. 1995) has also made use of the topic of the Bulgarian atrocities in his 
marvellous satire on trendy German university professors.
7 Because of Macedonia’s patchwork of ethnic groups, a multi-coloured fruit-salad was 
named after it in Mediterranean cuisine.
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different from Central or Western European warfare.8 After all, “regular” troops 
were only just being invented by baroque states-in-the-making; the establish-
ment of “standing armies” was a by-product of the ‘Forty Years’ War’ against 
Louis XIV (1672–1712);9 whereas the preceding Thirty Years’ War fought in 
the very centre of Europe certainly did have more than its share of atrocities of 
almost any imaginable sort. Massacres among “non-combatant” civilians were 
not confined to conflicts infused – or camouflaged – by religious tensions. Or, 
put the other way round: “The prospect of a sack, not salvation, underwrote ev-
ery successful jihad or crusade.” 10 In particular, the routine practice of allowing 
towns that were taken by storm to be sacked by the conquering army served the 
besieger’s interests as it provided a powerful incentive both for his men to fight – 
and for the enemy to surrender in time.11 During the conquest of Buda in 1686 
Imperial commanders took good care looting did not start before fighting had 
actually ended but then turned the town over to the victorious soldiers.12
It might be argued that most of the Balkans lent itself to irregular warfare 
because its mountainous terrain was unsuited to the ponderous manoeuvres of 
sizeable armies, including the artillery that could only be transported along the 
coast or the “broad Danube which provided the only easy route across East-
ern Europe for any army equipped with siege weapons.”13 The Ottomans found 
Szigetvar a little bit too close to the Danube for comfort, as the Habsburg gar-
rison sometimes tried to interrupt the traffic on the river. At one point during 
the 1550’s, the Ottomans complained that almost a thousand boats had been 
plundered by enemy raiders.14 The Imperial side could also float supplies down-
stream on the Drava, whereas the Turks tried to use the Sava to send siege guns 
8 One more element missing in the early modern period was the sort of rural over-popu-
lation that allowed men to be absent from the farm for extended periods throughout the 
year. That Malthusian situation was exacerbated by the early marriage age made possible by 
the networks of the extended, zadruga, family. Marie-Janine Calic, Sozialgeschichte Serbiens 
1815–1941. Der aufhaltsame Fortschritt während der Industrialisierung (Munich 1994), 58–60. 
9 Actually the term “Forty Years War” was coined a few years earlier by a French diplomat 
who correctly forecast a war of forty years if the Dutch persisted in their efforts to put a 
stop to French expansion in Flanders. See Herbert H. Rowen, “John De Witt and the Triple 
Alliance”, in Craig E. Harline, ed., The Rhyme and Reason of Politics in Early Modern Europe. 
Collected Essays of Herbert H. Rowen (Dordrecht 1992), 130.
10 Barnaby Rogerson, The Last Crusaders. East, West and the Battle for the Centre of the World 
(London 2009), 85.
11 Lothar Höbelt, “Surrender in the Thirty Years War”, in Holger Afflerbach and Hew Stra-
chan, eds., How Fighting Ends. A History of Surrender (Oxford 2012), 141–151.
12 Ferenc Toth, ed., Journal des campagnes du duc Charles V de Lorraine (Paris 2017), 400.
13 Rogerson, Last Crusaders, 251.
14 James D. Tracy, “The Road to Szigetvar: Ferdinand I’s Defense of His Hungarian Borders, 
1548–1566”, Austrian History Yearbook 44 (2013), 33; Klara Hegyi, “The Ottoman Network 
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upstream, towards Sisak and Zagreb.15 But they did find it rather difficult to 
carry heavy guns across the coastal mountain ranges when they wanted to lay 
siege to Venetian towns in Dalmatia. In 1657, they attempted to mount an at-
tack on Kotor with less than a dozen cannon.16 On a large-scale map, the “thin 
green line” of Venetian strongholds along the Dalmatian coast might look dan-
gerously exposed to the giant land mass of the Ottoman Empire. But the Vene-
tians would usually manage to move reinforcements far more quickly by sea than 
their enemies could do so by land.
However, it would probably be going too far to reduce the notion of Bal-
kan warfare to a matter of logistics only or to “deconstruct” it altogether. There 
do seem to be two elements connected with the presence of the Muslim Otto-
man Empire that served to inject an extra element of brutality into early modern 
warfare, i.e. into the way combatants treated each other – rather than the way 
combatants treated the hapless civilians where rules of engagement were far less 
strict, as “the cultural and social assumptions of the soldiers themselves did little 
to restrain lawless behaviour against those who were outside of the bounds of 
internal loyalty and recognition.”17
First of all, the cultural divide between Orient and Occident, Muslim 
and Christian societies that is such a touchy subject of present-day polemics did 
to all intents and purposes worsen the fate of prisoners. True, there was a long-
standing practice almost everywhere that prisoners of a certain stature would be 
ransomed by their captors. If someone offered to stand bail for them, they might 
even be furloughed to try and raise money on their own behalf.18 The brother of 
the Imperial Court Chamberlain, Count Hans Christoph Puchheim, who had 
been captured by the Swedes in 1639 spent years criss-crossing the “front” while 
trying to negotiate his release.19 In 1661, Transylvanians voting for a new Prince 
were faced with the choice of two candidates, Janos Kemeny and Michael Apafi, 
who had both become prisoners of war after George Rakoczi’s disastrous Polish 
campaign and had only recently returned from captivity in the Crimea.20
of Fortresses in Hungary”, in Geza David & Pal Fodor, eds., Ottomans, Hungarians and Hab-
sburgs in Central Europe (Leiden 2000), 164, 166.  
15 James D. Tracy, Balkan Wars. Habsburg Croatia, Ottoman Bosnia and Venetian Dalmatia, 
1499–1617 (Lanham 2016), 176, 255, 262, 284, 291.
16 Marko Jacov, Le guerre Veneto-Turche del XVII secolo in Dalmazia (= Atti e Memorie della 
Societa Dalmata di Storia Patria, Venice 1991), 123. I want to thank Maddalena Guiotto 
(Trento) for bringing that book to my attention. 
17 David Parrott, The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early 
Modern Europe (Cambridge 2011), xxx, 36.
18 Geza Palffy, “Ransom slavery along the Ottoman-Hungarian frontier in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries”, in Geza David & Pal Fodor, eds., Ransom Slavery along the Ottoman 
Borders (Early Fifteenth-Early Eighteenth Centuries) (Leiden 2007), 57.
19 Lothar Höbelt, Ferdinand III. Friedenskaiser wider Willen (Graz 2008), 148 f., 161, 199.
20 Maria Ivanics, “Enslavement, Slave Labour and the Treatment of Captives in the Crimean 
Khanate”, in David & Fodor, eds., Ransom Slavery, 193–219. 
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But what happened to the lowly “privates”? Unless they were also covered 
by some sort of exchange mechanism (or ‘cartel’), they were usually forced to 
take service with their captors. In that case they were sometimes transferred to a 
different “front” in order to decrease the likelihood that they would desert back 
to their former employers. Thus, Britons in French service who were captured 
at Tuttlingen in 1643 were sent to Hungary.21 During the ‘Glorious Revolution’ 
the remnants of James II’s Irish army were offered to the Habsburgs by William 
III who praised them effusively as “some of the choicest troops ever seen” but was 
so eager to get rid of them that he was even willing to pay for their transport to 
the continent.22
However, while a number of renegades were prominent in the Ottoman 
service (quite apart from the janissaries, who were originally forcefully recruited 
from Christian families as boys), there is little evidence that prisoners of war 
from Christian armies were routinely inducted into Ottoman armies (or the 
other way round). The assumption is that more than the usual percentage of 
such prisoners of war were either summarily killed, or permanently enslaved by 
their captors for private gain.23 Observers noted that as a result of the conquest 
of Buda by the Elector, the sedan bearers and gardeners at the Bavarian castle 
of Schleissheim consisted of Ottoman prisoners.24 The Imperial resident was 
shocked when during the Candian War the Pasha of Bosnia not only sent 1800 
heads as trophies to Constantinople after a battle in Dalmatia, but also made the 
few surviving prisoners do the dirty work of cutting their dead comrades heads 
off, cleaning them and treating them with salt so they would not rot on the way 
to the capital.25
21 Höbelt, Ferdinand III, 218. 
22 Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv Wien (HHStA), Vorträge 7, 1689, fol. 28a (14 March 
1689), based on a report by the Austrian resident in London about a conversation with Wil-
liam III. In fact, the Habsburgs would have preferred for them to be sent to Ragusa/Du-
brovnik straight away. In fact, once the Irish arrived in Hamburg, they declared they had been 
deported against their will and would only fight for king James (HHStA, Kriegsakten 217, 
fol. 84-95, 102-5, reports 1 & 4 June 1689). 
23 That statement might, of course, be qualified by the observation that, technically at least, 
most of the Ottoman bureaucracy and armies consisted of slaves. Baki Tezcan, The Second 
Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World (Cambridge 
2010), 92, argues that this kind of “political slavery” was actually the equivalent of feudal 
relations within the “patrimonial” stage of the Ottoman Empire: “The slave servants of the 
sultans became the new nobility of the land.”
24 Janos J. Varga, “Ransoming Ottoman Slaves from Munich”, in David & Fodor, eds., Ran-
som Slavery, 169–181.
25 HHStA, Turcica 126, Mai-Sept. 1654, fol. 48 v., 26 May 1654. Jacov, Guerre Veneto-Turche, 
109, quotes a Turkish chronicle that puts the number at 1200 (plus 250 slaves). Previously, a 
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To put that episode into perspective: 1800 Venetians killed in battle did 
seem a disproportionate number considering the small size of the armies oper-
ating in Dalmatia.26 Yet, contemporaries’ disgust was directed less at the pre-
sumable massacre of prisoners than at its ritual character. Prisoners might be 
killed and robbed in Central Europe, too, but heads were publicly displayed as a 
deterrent only in the case of rebel leaders.27 Indeed, that is presumably why the 
head of a famous turncoat, Giafer Aga alias Voin Tujcovich, who had apparently 
changed sides several times, was also sent to Venice a few years later.28 The head 
of Hassan Pasha, who had been responsible for delivering 2000 heads to Con-
stantinople a year earlier, was sent to Rudolph II as a trophy after the second 
battle of Sisak in 1593.29 Of course, it might be argued that in the Ottoman 
worldview, all enemies of the padishah were supposed to be rebels. Still, killing 
prisoners, while at the same time organizing raids to bring in more captives, did 
seem to be economically counterproductive.
On the other side of the hill, Hungarian grandees used to sell Turkish 
captives to Venice as galley slaves at prices several times higher than the bounties 
paid to recruits which served as a standard per capita rate for ransom arrange-
ments.30 During the 1650’s, when the Emperor wanted his Hungarian subjects 
to hand over their captives in preparation for a comprehensive settlement of 
grievances with the Turkish authorities, he was warned that most of these war-
lords would kill their prisoners rather than hand them over.31 Apparently, the 
Batthyany castle of Nemetujvar/Güssing was filled to overflowing with captives 
Venetian report claimed the heads were put on display on the walls of the Ottoman outpost 
of Tenin. 
26 After the first battle of Sisak in July 1592, Hassan Pasha of Bosnia is said to have “sent 2000 
heads to the Porte, with two hundred captives and five large cannon.” (Tracy, Balkan Wars, 
262)
27 Just as there were massacres of rebels, like Alba’s infamous reprisals in the Netherlands. 
Some sorts of ritual cruelty – like being burned at the stake vs. being impaled on stakes – 
were supposed to be specific to certain cultures, but were every now and then copied by their 
opponents.
28 Jacov, Guerre Veneto-Turche, 125
29 Tracy, Balkan Wars, 289.
30 Geza Palffy, “Ransom Slavery, 35–83. The practice began when Venice started to buy 
convicts from its neighbours, including the Emperor, from the 1570s onwards, as their own 
citizens would no longer volunteer in sufficient numbers or accept to be drafted into service 
as oarsmen. Alberto Tenenti, Venezia e i corsari 1580–1615 (Bari 1961), 147–163; Ruggiero 
Romano, “Economic Aspects of the Construction of Warships in Venice in the Sixteenth 
Century”, in Brian Pullan, ed., Crisis and Change in the Venetian Economy in the 16th and 17th 
Centuries (London 1968), 65. 
31 Höbelt, Ferdinand III, 243, 360. 
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during that period.32 Prisoners were freely sold and resold on both sides of the 
border. When a particular group of Hungarian captives was supposed to be ran-
somed after a longer period of tedious negotiations, the result was disappoint-
ing: only five could be located; the rest had in the meantime changed hands sev-
eral times.33 For all the brutality of the Thirty Years’ War, no group of Christian, 
e.g. Swedish or French, prisoners seems to have met with quite such a fate, once 
they had survived the heat of battle (and pursuit). We do find reports, however, 
that some of the civilian hostages, e.g. Bosnian girls, captured by Christian raid-
ers were also traded and sold as far away as Livorno.34
The second element associated with the Ottoman way of warfare35 was 
the widespread use of light cavalry of an East-European type. The function of 
those raiders from akindji to Cossacks can perhaps be compared to the bombing 
raids of the first half of the twentieth century: they were supposed to spread ter-
ror and ravage the hinterland of the enemy rather than hit any specific military 
targets. Alpine villages started building fortified churches as early as the 1470’s 
to provide a minimum of protection in case of akindji raids. “On the border 
itself, the long-standing Ghazi tradition of incessant raiding brought low in-
tensity attacks on a more or less permanent basis.”36 That sort of cavalry found 
its natural habitat not in the mountains of the Balkans but in the steppe of 
Eastern Europe but it was imported into the battle zone between Ottomans 
and Habsburgs – and sometimes re-exported to areas as far afield as the killing 
fields of Flanders. When Richelieu was on the point of declaring war on Spain 
in 1635, his counterpart, the Count-Duke of Olivares, had high hopes of the 
deterrent effect of Croatian and Cossack raids on French morale.37 However, 
the Cossacks recruited by the Habsburgs during the 1630’s were atypical in one 
respect: they insisted on proper and punctual payment. 
32 Palffy, “Ransom Slavery”, 41.
33 HHStA, Turcica 126, May–Sept. 1654, fol. 93 v., 15 June 1654.
34 Jacov, Guerre Veneto-Turche, 135; Tracy, Balkan Wars, 257, 342, mentions a report about 
Apulian merchants buying slave girls in Senj. 
35 Rhoads Murphey, Ottoman Warfare, 1500–1700 (London 1999).
36 A. Wess Mitchell, The Grand Strategy of the Habsburg Empire (Princeton 2018), 125.
37 Heinrich Günter, Die Habsburger-Liga 1625–1635 (Berlin 1908), 436, 444 (Olivares to 
Onate, 16 Feb. & 7 April 1635); Lothar Höbelt, “Barocke Bomberflotten ? Die ‘polnischen 
Völcker’ als habsburgische ergeltungswaffen 1635/36”, in Heeresgeschichtliches Museum 
(Hg.), Vom Söldnerheer zu UN-Truppen. Heerwesen und Krieg in Österreich vom 17. bis zum 
20. Jahrhundert” (= Acta Austro-Polonica 3, Vienna 2011), 29–43; David Parrott, “The Caus-
es of the Franco-Spanish War of 1635–59”, in Jeremy Black, ed., The Origins of War in Early 
Modern Europe (Edinburgh 1987), 72–111.
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Border warfare and the “Wild East” of Europe
The sort of “irregular” warfare associated with the Balkans does not just refer to 
guerrilla operations or cavalry raids accompanying regular campaigns but also 
includes the sort of border skirmishing that went on even during periods of 
peace or at least truces among the belligerents, a sort of “Wild East” of early 
modern Europe. In Balkan terms those belligerents consisted of the Ottoman 
Empire, the Republic of Venice and the Habsburgs (in their many incarnations 
from Holy Roman Emperors and Kings of Hungary to Dukes of Styria or Car-
niola). Actually “keeping the peace” on the porous and provisional borders of 
those three empires was first and foremost a matter of internal discipline, of 
asserting the centre’s authority over wayward frontiersmen.
If we ask ourselves which of those great powers was best qualified to ex-
ercise strict control over their vassals and subordinates, it is easy to spot the 
winner: in all likelihood it was Venice that was able to police its border best of 
all, the only cautionary note being that we know far less about Venetian warfare 
on land than about their glorious exploits at sea. As a city-state the Republic 
was used to running a tight ship. That is why Venetian diplomats were shocked 
to observe the tolerance Vienna emperors extended towards aristocrats accused 
of violating border agreements (or even of other criminal infractions): “In Ger-
many one is not accustomed to inflict major penalties on gentlemen unless they 
are declared guilty of lèse majesté.”38 As between Habsburgs and Ottomans, it 
is the Habsburgs, or rather their Hungarian (including Croatian) subjects who 
seem cast in the role of the main culprits. The sheer repetitiveness of restraining 
orders directed at Hungarian nobles to stop harassing the Turkish border gar-
risons is a tell-tale sign in that respect.39
Still, in that case we are dealing with a difference of degree only. The 
Ottoman Empire did not always live up to its reputation as a disciplined if des-
potic centralized state, either. “While possessing the core of a standing army, 
38 HHStA, Dispacci di Venezia, vol. 89, no. 182, 18 June 1644: “[…] non accostumandosi in 
Germania di dar maggior castigo alli Cavalieri quando non sono dichiarati rei di Lesa Mae-
sta.” In that case, the Venetian Ambassador was furious because the gentleman in question 
was Count Philipp Thurn, who as commander of the scenic Adriatic castle of Duino had 
opened fire upon Venetian ships (Dispacci, vol. 88, no. 97, 28 Nov. 1643). Fortunately for 
Austrian researchers, the dispatches of the Venetian ambassadors to the Imperial Court were 
copied by the Vienna archives before being returned to the Italians after 1866.
39 While the amount of correspondence that survived in the collections of Alte Feldakten 
(AFA) in the Austrian War Archive (Kriegsarchiv) depends on the fortunes of the papers of 
individual commanders (there is very little e.g. on the wars against the Turks after 1683!), a 
short resume of the orders of the Aulic War Council can always be found in the “registratur” 
volumes of the “Hofkriegsrat”. 
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the system supporting it was unstable and contingent on victory.”40 Quite apart 
from the mountain regions which it did not pay to administer properly, even 
in strategically important areas such as the river region between Vienna and 
Buda, standards of rule enforcement declined during the seventeenth century, 
especially during the interval between Murad IV’s death in 1640 and the rise 
of the Koprülüs at the end of the 1650’s. Increasingly, centrifugal tendencies 
made themselves felt even in the one empire devoid of the feudal heritage that 
served to make “absolutism” such a questionable term in the rest of Europe.41 
In the 1520’s, Luther had still warned German knights: “The Turk knows how 
to discipline and humiliate the nobility.”42 In the meantime, however, Western-
European monarchies and Ottoman rulers seemed to be on converging tracks: 
European monarchies became more centralized at the same time as the Otto-
mans reached the outermost geographical limit of their expansion and fell prey 
to “Imperial overstretch”.43
There is a fascinating exchange about common problems and different 
procedures to be found in the protocol of a meeting between an Imperial diplo-
mat and the Pasha of Buda in 1652. The background to that visit was an increase 
in border raiding after 1648. The Peace of Westphalia in the West, coupled with 
signs of internal turmoil in the Ottoman Empire (like the successful janissary 
revolt against Sultan Ibrahim “the Mad” in 1648) had raised hopes among Hun-
garian nobles that the Habsburgs would use the opportunity to lead a crusade 
for the reunification of their kingdom. Military authorities in Vienna used that 
well-known longing to persuade the Hungarians to accept some 10,000 veterans 
of the Thirty Years’ War as reinforcements – not because they actually wanted 
to start a fight against the Turks but in order to shift the expense of their upkeep 
to the Hungarians.
In turn, among Hungarians nobles there was a strong undercurrent to 
push the Emperor into war against his will by provoking incidents over and 
above the usual expeditions to squeeze rent or tribute from their possessions 
beyond the provisional frontier running through Hungary. The Venetian am-
40 Mitchell, Grand Strategy, 128.
41 Wolfgang Reinhard, Geschichte der Staatsgewalt. Eine vergleichende Verfassungsgeschichte 
Europas von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart (Munich 1999), 51, argues the term has been 
“deconstructed” so much that it should no longer be used.
42 “Der Türke weiß den Adel zu mustern und zu demütigen” (Martin Luther: Vom Kriege 
wider den Türken).
43 Tracy, Balkan Wars, 380, comes to a similar conclusion. Tezcan, Second Ottoman Empire, 
197, 240, would argue that this “Second Empire” with its empowerment of local notables 
represented an improvement in terms of state-society relations. William Godsey, The Sinews 
of Habsburg Power. Lower Austria in a Fiscal-Military State 1650–1820 (Oxford 2018), offers a 
somewhat similar argument for the Habsburg administration that knew when to rely on the 
cooperation – and the credit – of the estates.
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bassador approvingly quoted a Hungarian aristocrat, Count Adam Forgach, the 
nephew of the Hungarian Palatine, Count Pal Palffy. Forgach wanted to use ev-
ery possible means to make the Emperor break with the Ottomans.44 He argued 
for retaliation as the only possible means of defence against Turkish raiders who 
grew insolent if they did not have to fear any revenge (the report used the Ital-
ian term vendetta or “vindita”). The Emperor’s order to fight raiders only when 
they were caught “in flagranti” was impossible to execute. Only angels – or devils 
– might be able to do so.45 Some of Forgach’s countrymen even added threaten-
ingly that if the Emperor did not declare war on Turkey, he was bound to lose 
the whole kingdom in a short time.46
When Kara Murad, the then Pasha of Buda and former Grand Vizier, 
received Johann Metzger, a secretary of the Imperial War Council, he assured 
his visitor that the Turks had no grievances against the Germans, but regarded 
them as friends, as partners at least in what a later age might have called “peace-
ful coexistence”. In his view it was only the Hungarians that caused all the trou-
ble.47 But of course, once provoked, Turkish commanders could not be blamed 
for retaliating in kind. Once again, as with early strategic bombing doctrine, re-
taliation seemed to be the only available option. That sort of escalation had led 
to the Battle of Vezekeny, in present-day Slovakia, on 26 August 1652, famous 
because of the death of no fewer than four members of the powerful Esterhazy 
family in an ambush.48
To demonstrate his good faith, Kara Murad Pasha offered to have the 
offending local commander, Mustafa Bey of Esztergom, beheaded in his guest’s 
presence if the Imperials would agree to do the same to Forgach, who was the 
commander of their border district north of Esztergom. This gracious offer 
proved to be embarrassing to the Imperial envoy. Gingerly, he tried to explain 
that Forgach could not be removed just like that. After all, as a member of an 
ancient noble family he actually owned the lands he was fighting for. If that is so, 
the Pasha replied, I have to say, my Mustafa is just as ancient and noble, too.49 
44 HHStA, Dispacci 94, no. 154, 7 August 1648: “[…] vorrebbero in ogni maniera condur 
l’Imperatore a romper la guerra al Turco.”
45 Kriegsarchiv (KA), AFA 135 VII/2, letter to Piccolomini, 13 July 1654.
46 HHStA, Dispacci 96, no. 250, 16 April 1649: “[…] e sicuro di perdere in breve tempo tutto 
questo regno.”
47 That attitude found a parallel a century earlier, in 1547, when Grand Vizier Rüstem Pasha 
had wanted to exclude the Zrinyi family from the truce of Edirne. (Tracy, Balkan Wars, 152) 
48 Laszlo Berenyi, “Die Schlacht bei Vezekeny (26. August 1652)”, Burgenländische Heima-
tblätter 64 (2002), 95–120; Lothar Höbelt, “Friedliche Koexistenz – unfriedliche Grenze: 
Der Hintergrund der Schlacht von Vezekeny 1652”, Burgenländische Heimatblätter 73 (2012), 
1–34.
49 HHStA, Turcica 125, Sept.-Dec. 1652, fol. 90 v., Metzger’s report of 23 Oct. 1652.
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There is a footnote to that tongue-in-cheek offer, however. When rumours 
spread that Kara Murad wanted to have Mustafa Bey arrested nevertheless, the 
janissaries of Buda staged a mutiny. Mustafa left Buda quite jauntily and contin-
ued to be a thorn in the side of the Austrians for years to come.
The impression is that in practice, if not in theory, the autonomy of local 
commanders seems to have reached a similar stage on both sides of the border 
at that particular point in time. When referring to the last incidents along the 
Austro-Turkish borders in the early nineteenth century, Gunther Rothenberg 
commented: “This time, however, the incidents were not signs of an aggressive 
spirit, but merely the outward manifestations of the increasing disorganization 
and discontent in the Ottoman lands.”50 The same observation already holds 
true for mid-seventeenth century raiding when Ottoman centralism was no lon-
ger working and Habsburg centralism not yet. In both cases, the raiding on the 
frontier was also a result of trying to run a border on the cheap, with proper pay 
and provisions for the garrisons frequently withheld or in arrears. The small part 
of Hungary that remained in the Habsburg hands after the mid-sixteenth cen-
tury was clearly unable to pay for more than at best a fourth of the frontier gar-
risons.51 As a result, many of the key fortresses were turned over to be admin-
istered by the neighbouring provinces of the Holy Roman Empire. Of course, 
“fortresses depended on supplies from populated hinterlands.”52 Thus, on the 
Ottoman side, the situation seems to have improved after the hinterland of the 
garrisons had been expanded during the 1550s and 1560s.53 Maybe the secret 
was “to fight as the Ottomans fought, by hiring low-paid raiders”.54 However, 
even on the Ottoman side, the economic situation seems to have deteriorated 
after the Long War of 1593–1606. David Parrott has summed up the dynamics 
of the “wild East” with respect to the Adriatic part of the Habsburg-Ottoman 
frontier: “The combination of a proportion of the male Uskok population per-
forming virtually unpaid service in garrison, and the rest of the community de-
pendent on land with limited agricultural potential, turned banditry and piracy 
50 Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Austrian Military Border in Croatia, 1522–1747 (Urbana 
1960), 124 f.
51 Geza Palffy, “Border Defence Systems against the Ottoman Empire in Hungary”, in David 
& Fodor, eds., Ottomans, Hungarians and Habsburgs in Central Europe: The Military Confines 
in the Era of Ottoman Conquest (Leiden, 2000), 41. 
52 Tracy, “Road to Szigetvar”, 28.
53 Gabor Agoston, “The Costs of the Ottoman Fortress System in Hungary in the Sixteenth 
and Seventeenth Century”, in David & Fodor, eds., Ottomans, Hungarians and Habsburgs, 
211.
54 Tracy, Balkan Wars, 166.
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from activities connected with the defence of the frontier into a modus vivendi, 
with its own economic and social dynamics.”55
The Uskoks settled in the area where all three Empires met in what has 
become a trouble-spot again in the late twentieth century, namely the Krajina 
and its surroundings, located at the crossroads between Venetian Dalmatia, 
Habsburg Croatia and Ottoman Bosnia. The implosion of the medieval king-
dom of Hungary after the battle of Mohacs in 1526 had left a few isolated gar-
risons, precariously wedged between Venetian coastal strongholds like Zadar 
or Šibenik and the waves of the Ottoman advance. To make matters worse, at 
the very beginning, there was still a certain element of collusion between the 
Muslim superpower and their Venetian trading partners, both of them opposed 
to Habsburg hegemony in Europe (and in Italy, in particular). Accordingly, the 
Uskoks lashed out at both of them, but received only lukewarm and halting 
support from the Habsburgs. The first Uskok stronghold was Klis, a mountain 
fortress overlooking the harbour of Split. When Klis fell to the Ottomans in 
1537, the centre of resistance moved to Senj on the Adriatic. Raiding could now 
also be conducted by sea.56
Uskok herders and villagers were routinely uprooted and “displaced”. Both 
voluntarily and involuntarily, they moved from one side to another of an uncer-
tain and shifting border. Their fighting men were recruited and dismissed ac-
cording to the vagaries of great power politics in a three-cornered contest. Ven-
ice could only afford brief periods of fighting against the Turks, as between 1537 
and 1540 or at the time of the Lepanto campaign in 1571–73. The Habsburgs 
in Vienna usually followed a more ambivalent strategy that combined a desire to 
avoid a full-scale confrontation with clandestine encouragement of anti-Turkish 
forces. The Habsburgs did not want to relinquish their claims on the whole 
of the Hungarian inheritance. That is why in 1562 they rejected a proposal to 
establish firm boundaries by dividing Hungary once and for all.57 Thus, a broad 
frontier zone with overlapping claims of jurisdiction and tax-raising remained 
the norm. The cadet branch of the Habsburgs in Graz – with their links to 
powerful Croatian nobles – was even more committed to the defence of that 
frontier zone.
Venice, on the other hand, resented the raiding activities of the Senj Us-
koks. In their 1573 treaty after the Battle of Lepanto, the Ottoman Empire had 
agreed not to send any of their warships into the Adriatic, in return for Venetian 
55 Parrott, Business of War, xxx (6). 
56 Tracy, Balkan Wars, 109, 160; Catherine W. Bracewell, The Uskoks of Senj. Piracy, Banditry, 
and Holy War in the Sixteenth Century Adriatic (Ithaca 1992). “Uskok” was the Serb term for 
refugee. Venetian reports spoke of Morlacchi.
57 Tracy, Balkan Wars, 216. Maximilian II showed some interest in such a deal a few years 
later but by that time the offer had apparently been withdrawn. 
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protection of their commerce. Uskok activities threatened to undermine that 
agreement, or at least force Venice to pay indemnities to the Turks for the losses 
they had suffered at the hand of the raiders.58 In 1615–17, Venice even fought 
an inconclusive war against the Styrian branch of the Habsburgs to force a re-
settlement of the Uskoks. Ominously, the Spanish viceroy of Naples, the Duke 
of Osuna, came to the Uskoks’ help and actually fought a pitched battle against 
the Venetian fleet in the waters around Korčula.59
Thus, the constellation of the 1520’s, with Venice and the Turks combin-
ing forces against the Habsburgs, seemed to have come alive again. A generation 
later, however, both governments had switched sides, in their attitudes towards 
those doughty exiles and pirates. After the mid-1640’s, the Vienna government 
of Ferdinand III, hard pressed as it was during the last years of the Thirty Years’ 
War, desperately tried to keep on the good side of the Turks who reciprocated by 
restraining the Transylvanians from adding their forces to the Franco-Swedish 
anti-Habsburg coalition.60 Venice, however, involved in the early stages of the 
Candian war, tried to stir up trouble along the “wild East” of the Habsburg Em-
pire and thus create a “second front” for the Ottomans.61
Sources do offer us fascinating glimpses of Venetian agents recruiting 
Catholic Bosnians for a sabotage attack on the crucial bridge at Osijek62 or en-
couraging the Archbishop of Esztergom to subvert the peace the Emperor was 
trying to uphold.63 The Venetians also bribed some of the powerful Croatian 
lords along the border, like the Frangipan or the Zrinyis, to continue raiding the 
Turks or at least provide the Venetian army with extra recruits.64 The Emperor 
did not want to compromise Habsburg neutrality and banned these enterprises. 
In practice, though, his orders were difficult to enforce as the Zrinyis were in 
58 Mario Nani Mocenigo, Storia della Marina Veneziana de Lepanto alla caduta della Repubbli-
ca (Venice 1935), 93; Tenenti, Venezia e i corsari, 15. 
59 Luis M. Linde, Don Pedro Giron, duque de Osuna. La hegemonia espanola a comienzos del 
siglo XVII (Madrid 2005), 147; Nani Mocenigo, Storia della Marina Veneziana, 99–112. 
60 The influential Spanish ambassador, the Duke of Terranova, was even supposed to have 
said that at a pinch the Austrians would have to allow Turkish troops to cross their territory 
to attack the Venetian “terra ferma”, rather than be involved in the fighting themselves (HH-
StA, Dispacci 91, no. 400, 12 May 1646).
61 Unfortunately, there is apparently no modern history of the Candian War. See G. Cozzi, 
“Venezia nello scenario europeo (1517–1699)”, in G. Galasso, ed., Storia d’Italia, vol. XII: La 
Repubblica di Venezia nell’eta moderna 2 (Torino 1992), 5–200.
62 HHStA, Dispacci 96, no. 247, 9 April 1649, quoting a letter by the archbishop.
63 HHStA, Dispacci 91, no. 474, 7 Dec. 1646.
64 Nicolas Zrinyi had already offered his services to Venice in 1639 when the first sign of 
trouble with Turkey appeared on the horizon (HHStA, Dispacci 82, Nr. 119, 5 Feb. 1639). 
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possession of an Adriatic port of their own, Buccari.65 Only a few years before, 
the Zrinyis had still been eyed suspiciously by the Venetians as likely to provide 
the Pope with troops to be used against Venice during the so-called War of Cas-
tro.66 But the Ottoman attack on Crete turned those troublesome neighbours 
into potential allies of the embattled “Serenissima”.
These intrigues were linked with another aspect of Balkan military es-
tablishments, the so-called Military Frontier in Croatia, a cordon sanitaire that 
formed a curious example of religious heterodoxy within the Counter-Refor-
mation Habsburg Monarchy, as it was administered by Styrian officers, most of 
them Lutherans in the early stages, and manned by mainly Orthodox refugees 
from the Ottoman Empire. This military enclave was heartily disliked by the 
Catholic Croatian aristocrats like the Frangipanis who accused its officers of 
harbouring runaway serfs. As a result, whenever the threat of war seemed to 
have receded, the Croatian estates petitioned for the abolition of the Military 
Frontier (or at least for a reduction of its privileges). Usually, the Vienna Court 
would make soothing noises in their direction – until a new crisis served to re-
mind them of the usefulness of the Military Frontier, which proved its value not 
just as an “antemurale” against the Turks but as a bulwark against unruly Hun-
garians, too. Thus, Ferdinand III had been on the point of listening to the com-
plaints of the Croatians when the war with George Rakoczi erupted in 1644; as 
a result, the “graničari” (frontiersmen) returned to favour. The same mechanism 
came into play in 1703/4 when his son Leopold I faced the rebellion of Ferenc 
Rakoczi, George’s grandson.67
In the meantime, however, the Habsburgs had managed to reconquer 
Hungary. In 1698, after the Battle of Zenta and the peace of Rijswyk in the 
West, the Ottomans finally proved willing to enter into peace negotiations on 
the basis of uti possidetis. Most of the military experts in Vienna were keen on re-
taining the fortress of Peterwardein that would help to close the Danube to any 
Ottoman advance in future conflicts. Interestingly, there was a dissenting voice, 
based on the experiences of decades of border warfare. Count Ulrich Kinsky, the 
leading statesman of the monarchy at the time, argued that to avoid any future 
conflicts, it was far more important to turn the frontier zone quite literally into 
a desert: thus, in the future, the sort of raiding that had always sparked wars in 
the past, would be impossible. As a result, friction would be minimized and both 
65 HHStA, Dispacci 91, Nr. 374 & 375, 10 March 1646.
66 Lothar Höbelt, “Der Kaiser, der Papst, die Lega und Castro: Eine Fallstudie zur öster-
reichischen Neutralität”, Römische historische Mitteilungen 47 (2005), 217.
67 Tracy, Balkan Wars, 305; Rothenberg, Military Border I, 77–79, 98–99. The 1643/4 dis-
pute pitted the Frangipanis against the founder of the Schwarzenberg fortune, Count Louis, 
in his capacity as Colonel of the Varaždin border district. 
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sides would be able to enjoy “safety and quietness”.68 A supplementary clause 
of the peace treaty was also supposed to provide for the return of all prisoners 
without any ransom. If owners refused to return their prisoners they were to be 
fined 200 ducats for every male and 300 ducats for every female prisoner.69 
Summary: Europe’s “Frontier”  
Differences between European and extra-European styles of warfare certainly 
sharpened during the nineteenth century. The internal decomposition of the 
nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire, coupled with a certain infusion of Euro-
pean-style nationalism and a background of over-population, helped to put the 
Balkans into a sort of intermediate position on that scale. The Ottoman Empire 
was neither a great nor a European power – and yet, to some extent, it must still 
be regarded as both. 
At the beginning of the early modern period, the concept of Europe did 
not yet exist. Religion, not politics or geography, was the defining criterion. It 
was Christendom that people referred to – not Europe – when they wanted to 
introduce the concept of burden-sharing. In military terms, differences between 
Oriental and Occidental empires were less obvious; if anything, the Ottomans 
seemed to have a head-start in terms of centralization and professionalism. It 
was not the impact of Ottoman rule as such that created the conditions for 
“Balkan warfare”. It was the unsettled character of the borders between “East” 
and “West” that gave rise to a form of low-intensity conflict that might be said to 
provide a foretaste of what came to be known as Balkan warfare. That endemic 
conflict included a naval component of Mediterranean piracy that stretches from 
the heyday of Khair-ed-Din Barbarossa and the Maltese knights in the early 
1500’s70 to the American Marines and Tripoli in the early 1800’s;71 there was the 
68 HHStA, Turcica 166, fol. 153 v. (conference on 17 August 1698). Count Ernst Rüdiger 
Starhemberg as President of the Aulic War Council, heatedly argued against Kinsky’s idea 
of abandoning Peterwardein (ibid., fol. 167–175). Of course, Peterwardein could also be 
regarded as a springboard for an attack on Belgrade in any future war. 
69 HHStA, Turcica 166, fol. 177 v., Instructions for the Imperial delegates to the pace confer-
ence, 26 Sept. 1698.
70 Rogerson, Last Crusaders, 148 ff.; Rinaldo Panetta, Pirati e Corsari. Turchi e barbareschi nel 
Mare Nostrum. XVI secolo (Milan 1981); Miguel Angel de Burnus, Los Barbarroja. Corsarios 
del Mediterraneo (Madrid 2004), 106 (“corso di subsistencia”); Bruno Cianci, Le Navi della 
Mezzaluna. La Marina dell’Impero Ottomano (1299–1923) (Bologna 2015); Michel Fontenay, 
“Corsaires de la foi ou rentiers du sol? Les Chevaliers de Malte dans le ‘corso’ méditerranéen 
au XVII siècle”, Revue d’Histoire moderne et contemporaine 35 (1988), 361-–84. 
71 At the Congress of Vienna, Castlereagh was asked why Britain, who had tried to keep on 
good terms with the Barbary States during her wars with France and Spain, was apparently 
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unsettled border that for a century and a half – from 1541 to 1686 – cut across 
the overlapping claims of Hungarian nobles and Ottoman administrators;72 fi-
nally, there was the Ukrainian steppe where Tatar slave-raiding “was a nearly 
constant threat and inflicted heavy costs.”73
Maybe the Ukraine was the authentic “Wild East” of the emerging Eu-
rope. Slave-raiding was said to be “the only sure means of subsistence” for the 
Crimean Khanate. The Ukraine and Russia did provide a flow of white slaves 
that is sometimes overlooked when concentrating on the early modern Atlantic 
slave-trade only.74 The character of the Hungarian “frontier” was far less one-
sided. Its endemic small-scale warfare cannot be blamed on one side alone.75 
Border raiding did supply an extra source of income for underpaid garrisons 
but cannot be said to constitute a mainstay of the economy. In Croatia the 
Habsburgs tried to keep control of events by instituting the famous Military 
Frontier; in Hungary proper no such cordon sanitaire was established before 
the eighteenth century. The Ottomans had effectively destroyed the Serb and 
Bulgarian nobility; in Hungary, they only succeeded in driving the aristocracy 
into a sort of internal exile in the Northern and Western counties of the realm. 
But the Hungarian magnates and their private militias retained the power to 
only concerned with abolishing the international trade in black slaves, see C. Northcote Par-
kinson, Britannia Rules. The Classic Age of Naval History 1793–1815 (London 1977), 174.
72 Rothenberg, Military Border I, 124, notes that “the last flurry of Turkish incursions” actu-
ally took place between 1835 and 1846, long after Metternich had proved himself to be a 
staunch defender of the Ottoman Empire. See Friedrich Spigl, Repressaliengefechte an der 
kroatisch-türkischen Grenze in der Zeit von 1809–1845 (Vienna 1882). In my youth, the Austri-
an public was treated to a romantic TV-version of that milieu in a series about Omar Pasha 
alias Michael Latas (1806–1871), an Austrian officer who switched sides to join the Turks in 
1828. 
73 Brian L. Davies, Warfare, State and Society on the Black Sea Steppe, 1500–1700 (London 
2007), 23.
74 Ivanics, “Crimean Khanate”, 193; Rogerson, Last Crusaders, 95, claims: “In this period the 
soft steppe-land underbelly of Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine and Southern Russia was milked 
of about twenty thousand sad souls a year by Tartar raiders.” Charles King, A History of the 
Black Sea (Oxford 2004), 116, reduces that figure to 10,000 a year for the 16th century; the 
Cossacks favourite way of retaliation, at least during the 17th century, was piracy in the Black 
Sea. For a general overview see Manfred Pittioni, ed., Die muslimische Sklaverei. Das “vergess-
ene Verbrechen” (Vienna 2018); Murray Gordon, Slavery in the Arab World (New York 1989).
75 Marc L. Stein, Guarding the Frontier. Ottoman Border Forts and Garrisons in Europe (Lon-
don 2007), has based his study explicitly on a comparison with the American concept of 
“frontier”, whereas Rothenberg, Military Border I, 125, emphasized the difference between 
“the seeds of democracy and social mobility” in Frederick J. Turner’s thesis and the “highly 
despotic and all-pervading paternal despotism” of the Austrian version; however, at least in 
the early stages the status of Austrian granicari obviously did have its attractions vis-à-vis 
Croatian serfs. 
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hit back. Thus, old-style European feudal customs had at least as much to do 
with the lawless character of the Hungarian “frontier” as the Asiatic traditions 
attributed to the Ottomans.76 
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